However, he is now an arms control activist and a grandfather of ten who cares deeply about the future of his grandchildren. He is the author of the two-volume Rationale for Nuclear Disarmament, and is a current member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Arms Control Association and the Northwest Disarmament Coalition. He is also founder and president of the Third Millennium Foundation.

Whitmore fits no simple profile, but is well qualified to offer a critique of President Bush’s new defense initiative that threatens to propel the world into a second arms race.

In two forums, Whitmore demonstrated that the National Missile Defense initiative is foolhardy.

Whitmore says the proposed program can intercept only a few potential weapons of mass destruction (WOMD), the least probable of threats to the US. NMD does not touch covert weapons (i.e., suitcase bombs), cruise missiles, or ballistic attacks via sea launches. The only WOMD that the system could prevent is land-based ballistic attacks. It seems clear that an enemy bent on assailing the US would simply seek to develop a cruise missile or detonate a covert nuclear weapon.

But the efficacy of NMD’s defense against land-based ballistic launches is also questionable. Whitmore demonstrated that in the case of a 20-missile attack the plausible chance of at least one warhead penetrating the system varies from 18 percent to 88 percent. This is not exactly seamless armor. Why is there such a wide uncertainty regarding the failure rate? Estimates cannot be firmly ascertained as a mere three system tests (all failures) have been performed to date and only 19 are scheduled before NMD deployment.

The $100 million-per-trial-run prohibits sufficient testing. Whitmore calculates that 200 predeployment tests would be needed to develop an effective system. The Bush plan for a blind, rushed deployment of NMD would not create the magical protective shield presented to the public, but instead, a makeshift sieve with holes whose size could not be measured until they were breached.

Whitmore adds that the ineffectiveness of NMD is not his greatest concern. The main problem, he said, is that this system would break the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. It would push China and Russia toward an alliance against the US. It would spur development of multiple warhead missiles. It would increase the national debt and steal jobs from the civilian sector (military projects employ only half as many people as civilian work).

Whitmore adds that NMD also siphons off efforts to counter WOMD. Proposed budgets to intercept terrorist threats and to secure nuclear materials in Russia are apparently set to be slashed in order to fund NMD.

Whitmore stated, “I am for a strong defense; people don’t realize that. But this shield gives the illusion of protection at the cost of gaining real protection.”