The following remarks appeared in the New York Times (Oct.31 1997). '"He's done more to promote our policy than we have", one (Washington) official said. Another added, "God bless Saddam"' (1). US leaders were pleased because Saddam Hussein had begun kicking out American weapons inspectors, thus providing a fresh excuse to continue UN sanctions against Iraq, and possibly a chance for military action. Only a week before, the UN Security Council had been seriously divided about whether to tighten sanctions against the Iraqi government (2), and for some time there had been signs that the Gulf War "coalition" was falling apart, but now the Security Council was reunited (3,4), at least temporarily.
Contrary to all the tough talk by State Department and Pentagon officials, it appears more and more likely that the US is currently supporting Saddam Hussein. It wouldn't be the first time. In 1963, Saddam Hussein worked with the CIA to carry out the coup by the Baath party, which eventually brought him to power in Iraq. The book, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite by Said K. Aburish, which was reviewed recently in Counterpunch (5), describes how the CIA, Saddam and other members of the Baath party collaborated to bring about the coup, murdering perhaps 5,000 people in the process. The United States went on to help Saddam win the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. According to Noam Chomsky, "There were no passionate calls for a military strike after Saddam's gassing of Kurds at Halabja in March, 1988; on the contrary, the US and U.K. extended their strong support for the mass murderer, then, also 'our kind of guy'" (64).
Why might key US leaders prefer that Saddam Hussein remain in power? A primary motivation is probably economic. Saddam Hussein continues to provide justifications for the UN Security Council to prolong the 9-year old international oil embargo against Iraq, and this embargo is profitable for US companies and banks. The Iraqi dictator also provides a more or less credible threat to neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia. In this way, he helps to justify long-term stationing of US military forces in the region and encourages Persian Gulf nations to purchase American and British weapons. Mr. Hussein is also playing the role of an official enemy. Outside enemies can be used to deflect attention from domestic problems, and frighten the public into spending large sums on the military. In addition, American and British policymakers have made Saddam Hussein into a scapegoat for the disaster they have caused in Iraq.
The State Department story about the US role in Iraq is full of holes. In August 1990, the American people were told that stringent international sanctions against Iraq were necessary in order to force the Iraqi army to withdraw from Kuwait. A few months later, we were informed that the sanctions weren't working, and a war was necessary. (In fact, the Gulf War probably was not needed to expel Iraq from Kuwait. As Noam Chomsky argued eloquently at the time, the sanctions together with the threat of war had sent Iraq racing to the negotiating table, but George Bush refused to talk (72).) Immediately after the war, we were told that these same sanctions which had been called ineffective, would now be extended for a new purpose; to force Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was also asked to return all Kuwaiti, property, persons and remains, and pay massive war reparations. It took awhile, but eventually the sanctions worked. In November of 1994, The Economist reported that Iraq had essentially complied with UN conditions for lifting the embargo. The UN weapons inspectors were, "...as sure as they can be that the lethal stuff had been identified and got rid of" (6). Months earlier, the Wall St. Journal had quoted Rolf Ekeus, the head of the UN special commission (UNSCOM),' "We feel we have a good handle on their existing weapons programs...We have found them, identified them and destroyed them" (76).
There was a brief panic on the oil markets amid fears that the embargo might end quickly, but then oil investors and executives breathed a sigh of relief (77). The monitoring system had to be tested for an indefinite period, and the Clinton administration let it be known that the sanctions would stay in place until Saddam Hussein was gone (7,8). The Economist predicted, "If or when Mr. Hussein concludes that whatever he does, America will not allow him to start reselling his oil, his period of careful compliance is likely to be over" (6).
It is clear that the UN sanctions were never designed to target Saddam Hussein's regime. Rather, they have hit the entire Iraqi population. If the aim of the sanctions were to weaken Saddam Hussein, one might reasonably expect that they would include restrictions on the travel and financial dealings of top officials (9). In fact, there were no travel restrictions on Iraqi leaders for the first 7 years of the embargo. Finally, in late 1997, a travel ban was approved, but it applies only to those Baath party officials who interfere with UN weapons inspectors (10). While the Security Council has prohibited Iraq from making weapons of mass destruction, it has done nothing to stop the manufacture of conventional weapons for the Iraqi army (11). If the US government really wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein, then why was he left in place at the close of the Persian Gulf War? Former Bush advisor, Brent Scowcroft has stated that the US military tried to target the Iraqi dictator from the air during the war, but missed (12). This does not explain why, after Mr. Hussein's army had been overwhelmingly defeated, the US military was ordered not to pursue the dictator to Baghdad (12).
At least three times since the Gulf War, the US has helped to make it easy and convenient for Saddam Hussein to find and eliminate opponents of his regime. Naturally, American officials claim that they had other ends in mind but failed in their noble efforts. As Peter Jenning commented on ABC news, however, "It certainly looks as if not one, but two US administrations did not want Saddam Hussein to be overthrown by the Iraqi people" (12).
The first time the US came to the aid of Saddam Hussein was in the spring of 1991(12, 72). A popular rebellion, which started in southern Iraq, was joined by Kurdish forces in the north, and then spread to most of Iraq's provinces. Did George Bush send aid to the freedom fighters and cheer them on? "Peter Jennings (voice over): But in the ceasefire negotiations between the Iraqi army and the United States, even as the rebellion was underway, General Schwarzkopf gave Saddam's generals permission to use the one weapon they needed to crush the rebellion-their armed helicopters. Today, the Iraqi opposition still believes the United States wanted Saddam's generals to win" (12). The Iraqi army managed to slaughter tens of thousands of the rebels, many of who were buried in mass graves, while US forces in the area failed to intervene (12,72). According to Noam Chomsky, the US also refused to help Iraqi generals who wanted to plan a coup against Saddam at that time. One general who led a rebellion against Hussein tried to get help from the US military unsuccessfully. Instead the Americans blew up an Iraqi arms dump to prevent his men from obtaining weapons, and then '"...disarmed the rebels..."' (72).
During the next few years, the CIA recruited Iraqi military officers who were interested in planning a coup against Saddam Hussein. Working with a few high-ranking ex-military officers from Iraq in London and Jordan, the CIA organized a group called "the Accord" to prepare a "quick-strike coup" (12,13, 78). Saddam Hussein found out about the plot, and in June and July of 1996, he ordered the arrest of more than 100 of his military officers (14, 78). At least 30 of them were executed. It appears that somehow, the dictator learned about the coup plan early on (12,14, 78).
During the same years that the CIA was assisting Hussein's rebel officers to their doom (roughly 1992-1996), the federal agency was also hard at work organizing a diverse coalition of Kurds, Sunni and Shiite Arabs, and others who said they wanted parliamentary democracy in Iraq. Members of a group called the Iraqi National Congress were gathered together in the northern Kurdish region, in a town called Salahuddin (12,14, 78). Teams of 4 to 10 American CIA agents were stationed in Salahuddin a (78).
One prominent member of the Iraqi National Congress was Massoud Barzani, the leader of a Kurdish faction called the "Kurdish Democratic Party" (KDP). . Barzani leads a Kurdish faction and was following a family tradition, since his father used to work for the CIA (15). Then, Massoud Barzani asked Saddam Hussein for help. The reason given was that Barzani wanted Iraq's military to help him in fighting his rival, Jalal Talabani, the leader of another Kurdish faction in Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (16,17). Saddam Hussein sent 30,000 troops into the Kurdish region, which marched into Arbil and took the city. Then, "Democratic Party of Kurdistan members guided Iraqi intelligence to the offices and homes of Iraqi National Congress member in Salahuddin within hours of Iraq's conquest of Irbil (sic) (14)". In essence, Barzani betrayed the Iraqis who were ready to fight for democracy (78), and gave their names and addresses to Saddam's forces. More than 150 members of the opposition were killed, and at least 600 fled to the Turkish border (12,18). The American CIA officers had cleared out several days before the Iraqi invasion (12).
The US response to this debacle was illuminating. In September 1996, President Clinton ordered missile strikes, not on Saddam's troops in the north, but in a totally different part of the country. A total of 44 cruise missiles were shot at targets in the south of Iraq, and the southern no-fly zone was extended (19). Soon afterwards, US officials rushed to forgive Massoud Barzani for his "blunder" (15). Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau Jr. was dispatched to Turkey to meet with Barzani, and ask him to abandon his alliance with Baghdad, and begin peace talks with Talabani (20). In late October, the US announced it would donate $7.3 million in food aid, exclusively for the Kurds in the North (16). The simplest way to explain these maneuvers is to propose that, rather than going back and forth, from the CIA to Saddam, and back to the US again, Barzani may simply have been working for the CIA all the time.
The surviving members of the Iraqi National Congress were flown out of Turkey on US planes (18). After a brief stay in Guam, they were brought to California, where 26 of the Iraqis were promptly arrested and placed in INS prison (12,21). All evidence against the freedom fighters was kept secret, even from their lawyers. Six of the Iraqis spent over 2 years in prison (92), while the case became an embarrassment to the Clinton administration. Eventually, part of the evidence was declassified after republican Senators Trent Lott, Orrin Hatch, and Jesse Helms petitioned for full disclosure (75). Meanwhile, former CIA director James Woolsey had signed on as a defense lawyer for the six men (65). In June of 1999, a mysterious agreement was reached allowing 5 of the prisoners to go, provided that they leave the US and find a third country to accept them. The sixth prisoner refused the deal and remains in prison (93).
As Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair have pointed out, the CIA is not a rogue agency, but "...the obedient executor of the will of the US government, starting with the White House "(WhiteOut,1998, Verso,p.vii). The agency's actions from 1992-1996 have had the result of bolstering the Iraqi dictatorship. In light of this record, claims that the CIA is currently making new efforts to aid Iraqi opposition groups should be viewed skeptically. Congress voted to spend $97 million on "military aid and training" for Iraqi dissidents in late 1998 (90). Pushed into the background, was the fact that the CIA had already spent more than $100 million on its previous efforts in Iraq since the Gulf War (78). Writing in the Wall St. Journal, Daniel Pearl commented, "Signing up with the U.S. is politically riskier for opposition figures than it was in 1992...And the US has a greater credibility problem among Iraqi.... Also while the previous campaign was covert, this one has been loudly advertised to its target, Saddam Hussein"(91). Understandably, a number of Iraqi dissident groups are rejecting the CIA's embrace.
Iraq contains somewhat more oil than Kuwait (23), and in 1989 it exported some 3 million barrels per day (24). In August of 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN embargo began which essentially stopped Iraq from exporting oil. Almost immediately, Saudi Arabia stepped in to fill the gap by increasing oil production by 3 million barrels per day (24,30). For the past 9 years, as the embargo has continued, Saudi Arabia has gained most of Iraq's potential oil revenues. The real price of a barrel of oil averaged roughly 16 dollars between 1990 and early 1998 (23), fell to $10-12 in 1998, and has since risen (23a). In total, Saudi Arabia has earned approximately $132 billion dollars, which Iraq has failed to earn. It is probable that much of this windfall has been invested in US companies and banks. Like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia is ruled by one family, which is very closely tied to the United States (26,27). As Joel Beinin has explained, "... both the Saudis and Kuwaitis pursue a policy of recycling petrodollars in the economies of Western Europe and North America. That means that most of the profits that are made from the sale of oil by the Kuwaitis and by the Saudis are reinvested in the stock market, in the purchase of real estate, in the purchase of United States government treasury bonds..." (26). A House Subcommittee, which tried to investigate the impact of Saudi petrodollars on the US economy in the 1970s and '80s, encountered great resistance from the administrations of Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan (27).
If Iraq were to resume exporting a full quota of oil, and the Saudis were to cut back, American companies and banks would benefit less. In the past, the bulk of the Iraq's oil profits were spent on providing for the Iraqi people (a population of approximately 20 million), and on Hussein's military. Shortly before the embargo began in 1990, Iraq was spending roughly $3 billion per year to import food, $7 billion per year for civilian purposes and reconstruction from the Iran-Iraq war, and $4 billion per year for military imports (28).
From December 1996 to June 1998, Iraq was allowed to sell 4 billion dollars worth of oil per year, roughly a fifth of former exports under UN Resolution 986 (29). The limit was then raised to $10.6 billion per year, but Iraq succeeded in pumping only about $5 billion worth of oil in 1998, due to low oil prices and damaged pipelines and equipment (66,67,73). Recent increases in price and production allowed Iraq to sell $3.9 billion of oil in the first half of 1999, and exceed the $5.3 billion limit in the second half (85, 85a).
Since 1992, the US has knowingly allowed the Iraqi government to smuggle small amounts of oil to Turkey, by land, and to Iran and other ports by sea (71). The flow brings in as much as $400 million annually, presumably providing support for the dictator and his army. The trade also lines the pockets of our friend Massoud Barzani, who taxes the trucks full of oil as they pass through Kurdistan into Turkey (71).
Iraq has made deals with French and Russian oil companies to pump and refine its oil, so if Iraq resumes full production, US oil companies have nothing to gain (24). US oil companies do make money in Saudi Arabia, although the bulk now goes to the Saudi National Oil Company (Aramco) (27). US oil companies prefer to operate in countries like Venezuela and potentially Iran, which offer them lucrative production-sharing agreements (24). US imports of Mid- East oil vary from year to year. Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are currently vying for the position of top US supplier (68).
In general, higher oil prices mean higher profits for oil- producing countries, oil companies, and those who speculate on the oil market. During the past 81/2 years, Iraq's absence or near absence from the market has allowed Saudi Arabia to gain leverage over oil prices. Saudi Arabia holds approximately 12.8 percent of the world oil market (23). Without Iraq's former quota, the kingdom would have only 8.4 percent.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait, oil prices briefly soared to more than $30 per barrel (24). Perhaps the main reason was that both Iraq and Kuwait were effectively taken off the market, causing a restriction in oil supplies. Kuwait was back in production by 1992, and has since increased its OPEC quota by 46 percent above the pre-Gulf war level (31,34). Because Saudi Arabia replaced Iraq's oil exports with oil of its own, after the sanctions began in Aug. 1990, one would expect this move to cause no change in price. If Saudi Arabia froze production at 1990 levels while demand for oil grew, prices would tend to rise, as they did in 1995-96 (23). Iraq would likely cause a drop in oil prices if allowed to export a full quota again, if Saudi Arabia and Kuwait refuse to cut production to make room for Iraqi oil (30). For a long time the Saudis held on to the extra 3 million barrels per day inherited from Iraq, and allowed world prices to fall as Iraq pumped a little "oil-for-food" under the watchful eye of the UN, and the Asian crisis set in. Since April 1,1999, they have cut back by a half million barrels per day, but continue to hold approximately 80% of Iraq's old quota (23a).
Iraq is being forced to pay a staggeringly large bill in war reparations for its invasion of Kuwait. Claims totalling more than $220 billion have been filed by various countries, individuals, agencies, and companies (35). Corporations have claimed at least $80 billion, with $2.4 billion going to US companies (36). The US has also claimed nearly $8.8 million in environmental damages against Iraq (35).
According to careful studies by international researchers, approximately 500,000 Iraqi children under the age of five have died, because of the UN sanctions and lasting effects of the Persian Gulf War (37a, 37b). No one knows how many deaths of older children and adults the economic sanctions have caused. Middle East Watch has estimated that 2,500-3,000 Iraqi civilians were killed during the air war in 1991(80).
In November 1997, UNICEF reported that, "Almost one million children in southern and central Iraq are chronically malnourished..." (38). Nearly a million Iraqi children have had their growth stunted by malnutrition. Malnutrition in young children can cause reduced mental capacity and other lasting deficits. Before the most severe UN sanctions in history began, children in Iraq were generally well fed (39). Iraq sold oil and imported most of its food and medicine. Then in 1990, Iraq was prohibited from exporting oil and other goods, and for the next 6 and a half years, the country received very little revenue with which to buy food, medicine, and supplies. Domestic food production declined due to shortages of farm machinery, spare parts, fertilizers and chemicals (39). Two years after it was adopted by the Security Council (35,37b), the UN "food for oil deal" at last began to provide Iraq with $1.6 billion per year worth of food and $88 million worth of agricultural supplies in 1997 (39). It was known that these amounts would be inadequate to solve Iraq's food crisis (9). Due to pressure from the European Union, the "food-for-oil" agreement was expanded on May 30,1998 (79). In theory, Iraq can now sell enough oil to receive $3.1 billion worth of humanitarian supplies every 6 months. In practice, due to infrastructure constraints and low oil prices, Iraq secured less than $1.8 billion for humanitarian supplies during the latter half of 1998, and less than $2.7 billion in the first 6 months of 1999 (37b, 85). Iraq is currently experiencing the worst drought on record, and UN workers expect half the wheat and barley crop to fail (86a,b).
Food is not the only problem. During the Gulf War, US bombs targeted electrical plants, oil refineries and transportation networks (41). When the electricity went out, sewage treatment plants stopped pumping, and water supplies became contaminated. "Poor sanitation ignited an epidemic of cholera, typhoid, gastoenteritis and other water-borne diarrheal diseases" (42). The embargo has impeded Iraq from obtaining chlorine and spare parts to repair the electrical systems and sewage treatment plants properly (9,40). Iraq's water problems are being made worse by Turkey, which is building huge dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers upstream from Iraq and diverting the flow to irrigation projects. Turkey has plans to sell water to Cyprus and possibly Israel (87).
Before the sanctions, Iraq had one of the most advanced and efficient health care systems in the region (9,40). By 1997, a quarter of the country's health centers had shut down, and 75% of hospital equipment was not working (37b). Severe shortages of essential medicines have only been partly alleviated by the "food-for-oil" plan (37b). The Iraqi economy has virtually collapsed, and hyperinflation has shrunk government salaries, so many doctors and professionals have taken outside jobs or left the country (40). . Iraqi schools have declined and now often lack blackboards, chalk, pencils and paper (pencils and textbooks are designated "non-essential" by the Sanctions Committee). Students may sit 4 to a desk or on the ground, and many schools are without water and toilets (40). In addition, the numbers of street children, working children, and juvenile delinquents have increased (40). Children are regularly killed and maimed by ordinance left from the Gulf War, including numerous bomblets scattered by the cluster bombs which were dropped on Iraq, and thousands of landmines dispersed in Southern Iraq, Kuwait and the Northern Kurdish zone (80).
As Fareed Zakaria noted, on various occasions when it has appeared likely that sanctions against Iraq might be lifted, Saddam Hussein has done something, which has caused the members of the Security Council to change their minds (43). For example, "In 1994, at a time when the coalition to block Iraqi oil sales was splintering, he moved and mobilized troops near the Kuwaiti border." (43). In September of 1996, when thousands of Iraqi children were dying monthly from hunger and disease, and the crises was gaining international attention, it looked like the food for oil deal would finally go through (44). Anxious to keep oil prices high (45) and profits flowing into the right pockets, the US had been blocking the UN agreement to allow Iraq to sell a limited quantity of oil to buy food and medicine since May (46). When Saddam Hussein marched troops into Kurdistan, suddenly there was a new excuse for keeping Iraqi oil entirely off the world market. The UN promptly suspended the agreement and oil prices surged (47).
More recently, events have followed a similar pattern. In the fall of 1997, when the Gulf War coalition was fading away (3), and key members of the Security Council (Russia and France) were pushing to lift the sanctions (48), Saddam Hussein first barred and then ejected American weapons inspectors from Iraq (49). It seems reasonable to predict that in the future, when the oil embargo is in jeopardy, the US will be able to count on Saddam to help extend it.
Saddam Hussein also provides a possible threat to neighboring countries, and hence an excuse for leaving extensive US military forces in the region (43). Iraq's neighbors also buy weapons, and roughly 43% of these come from US companies (50). Saudi Arabia has spent tens of billions on military jets and equipment (50), and in 1997 it shelled out a whopping $9 billion as the world's leading arms importer (70). Saudi Arabia also paid $75 billion to finance the Gulf War (33).
Saddam Hussein also serves as a convenient scapegoat. In fact he has done a number of things to make the humanitarian crises in Iraq worse than necessary. He has repeatedly rejected and delayed the UN "food for oil deal", claiming that he is holding out for better terms (6,51,52). He has spent Iraq's internal reserves to employ people building a new palace for him in Babylon and constructing big dams (53,54), rather than on solving Iraq's urgent problems, such as sewage disposal, and food production, and at times, he has turned away shipments of humanitarian aid(66). Thus, US officials have been able to shift the blame, and pretend that Saddam is the only one responsible for the problems in Iraq. It should be obvious that one cannot rob a country of virtually all income for years and bomb it repeatedly without causing serious damage, but the focus on Saddam Hussein distracts people from this basic fact.
In the week before Christmas 1998, President Clinton ordered a military attack on Iraq. During 3 days, more than 400 cruise missiles were fired and 600 bombs were dropped, killing and wounding an unknown number of Iraqi civilians. An oil refinery was damaged, a secondary school was destroyed, and the water supply for 300,000 people was knocked out (81,82). A low-level war in the US designated "no-fly zones" over Iraq (88) has continued since Jan.4, 1999. The Pentagon admitted that missiles hit residential areas in and around Basra by mistake on January 25 (83). A UN official reported that the missiles killed 17 civilians, most of them children, and nearly 100 others were wounded. (84). On May 3, Hans von Sponeck, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, visited the site where an American bomb had recently struck a shepherd's tent, killing a family of 7 (89). Iraqi government reports suggest that scores more Iraqi civilians may have been killed and wounded during the ongoing bombardments called "Operation Northern Watch". US bombs have also hit Iraqi oil pipeline control stations twice, as the air-strikes have continued for the past five months, almost daily, with few breaks (74).
President Clinton said the December bombing was necessary because Saddam Hussein was, yet again, refusing to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. He said that the goal of the attack was to, "...degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors." A more important goal may have been to increase Saddam Hussein's popularity in Iraq and promote loyalty to the chief, particularly among restless officers in the Baath party. Even a dictator needs some legitimacy, and Saddam Hussein has had some problems lately. People in Iraq may suspect he is working for the US "Many Iraqis now believe that despite the outward impression of wanting to remove Saddam Hussein from power, there is in the West a deep desire to keep him where he is" (35). Efforts are being made to convince the Iraqi people that Saddam Hussein is trying to protect them, and the US is a greater threat to them than he is. The dictator must appear to be brave and defiant, standing up to America in order to help Iraqis. When the US fired a few missiles at Iraq in the fall of 1996, the New York Times reported, "Iraqis interviewed in Baghdad and in exile say the almost annual confrontations with the West are solidifying Mr. Hussein's position rather than eroding his rule" (58). When Bill Clinton threatens or attacks Iraq, the dictator tends to become more popular, while ordinary Iraqi people fear for their lives. Similarly, when Saddam Hussein talks tough and the US media amplifies his image as a fierce Middle Eastern dictator, American leaders and the Pentagon may gain popularity.
The need to enhance legitimacy may explain why Saddam has sometimes been allowed to win minor concessions from the UN and the US. In the fall of 1997, Iraq first barred and then expelled American weapons inspectors. President Clinton responded by sending warships to the Persian Gulf. After a little Russian diplomacy, events culminated in the US not firing any missiles and offering to discuss expansion of the "food for oil" deal (49,63). Thus, it looked like Saddam Hussein had scored a victory of sorts. Further moves against weapons-inspectors lead to renewed bomb threats by US officials in February of 1998, giving Saddam a chance to look brave as he faced the danger, while ordinary Iraqi people feared for their lives (55). After negotiations, conducted by Kofi Annan this time, the US failed to attack and agreed to allow diplomats to accompany UNSCOM teams to presidential sites (56). It is important to remember that Hussein is the weaker partner in these arrangements. He remains in Iraq so long as he can be of service to his masters.
World oil prices crashed by more than 40 percent in 1997-98, primarily due to the East Asian economic crisis, and prices have only recently begun to recover (33). It is possible there may be pressure from the US, Britain and their allies to try to raise oil prices, or transfer profits, by suspending the "oil-for-food" program. Under the terms of the UN deal, more than a third of the money is not used to buy food or medicine. Instead, 30 percent is confiscated by the UN to pay war reparations, 5-10 percent is used to fund UN humanitarian and inspection operations in Iraq, and 5-10 percent pays for oil pipelines and equipment repairs (9).
This is a key moral issue, particularly for American and British citizens. The situation in Iraq is gaining national and international attention. Five hundred thousand Iraqi children have died, and a million more have been stunted by malnutrition (37a). The US and the UK bear primary responsibility for the crises. If the American people knew the truth about Iraq, the majority would be outraged.
We have been told that Iraq may be making or hiding chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons. In fact, whatever weapons Iraq has or can manufacture probably do not represent a significant threat to the United States (59). Iraq does not possess a single complete nuclear weapon, yet during the Gulf War, the United States and Britain surrounded Iraq with more than 1,000 nuclear weapons and threatened to use them. (61). Discussion of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has been at the heart of Gulf War and sanctions propaganda, ever since a 1990 poll showed that Americans responded strongly to this issue (61). It is likely that Saddam Hussein is currently pretending to have (and attempting to obtain) as many armaments as possible. Endless exploration of this topic certainly helps to sustain the UN sanctions.
It costs an estimated $50 billion per year to keep American military forces in the Persian Gulf (62). Ordinary Americans suffer when civilian needs are neglected, in favor of weapons and war. Efforts to turn the Iraqi people into an enemy do not increase the safety of residents of the US and Britain.
Roger Normand of the Center for Economic and Social Rights has suggested expanding the food- for-oil deal to "...allow Iraq to sell enough oil to meet all civilian needs" (9). He also proposed that, "the Security Council should consider replacing the comprehensive trade sanctions with an arms embargo and restrictions on travel and financial dealings that target the government only" (9). These are excellent ideas and should be implemented as soon as possible.
If the hypothesis presented here is correct, i.e. Saddam Hussein is effectively working for US leaders, it may be difficult to bring a permanent end to the trade sanctions. The Iraqi dictator may escalate hostilities with the UN in any of a number of ways, or perhaps cancel the current "food-for-oil" program. A lasting solution will probably require dramatic change, both in American policy and in Iraqi policy. Ultimately, we must stop the suffering and dying, and repay the Iraqi people for the damage done to them and their country.
(Ruth Wilson thanks Mark Gardner for help with editing, Bert Sacks for valuable information, and Rabia Harris for important ideas.)
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